

PSC 403k/603k: Environmental Governance and Institutions

“Problems in American Public Policy”

Class Time: Tuesday and Thursday, 11am - 12:15pm, Room WRB 2020

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Description

This course is fundamentally about problem-solving. We will examine how groups of people are able to design and maintain the institutions necessary for providing and producing public goods. While concentrating on the substantive area of environment and natural resources, the concepts and theories covered are appropriate for anyone interested in developing solutions to a broad array of public problems. The course will introduce key theoretical concepts while remaining grounded in practical policy problems, and is designed as a mix of theory and application. At various times during the semester graduate students will be asked to present readings to the class, or provide other leadership for class activities.

While essentially a course on policy analysis, it takes a slightly different approach and examines how institutions are created to address public problems. Traditionally, the study of public policy has focused on the politics underlying the regulatory and legal process. However, the actions of formal government are only part of the story and the focus on government has gradually been supplanted by the broader concept of governance. The use of the term "governance" is selected intentionally for this course in order to incorporate the full range of mechanisms of social choice that society uses to address public problems. Governance can be defined as the exercise of decision-making toward solving common problems and comprises the complex array of mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate interests, obligations and rights. This includes government, civil society, the private sector and individual citizens. It explicitly examines the ability of individuals, communities and both informal and formal organizations to self-govern and solve a variety of public good dilemmas.

The course is divided into four sections: 1) Public Goods Theory, Public Policy and Collective Action, 2) Institutions, 3) Models of Decision-making, and 4) Policy Design and Performance. During the semester we will cover a number of the major theories of public policy, examine current topics in policy analysis, and generally explore the relationship between decision-making and institutions in the area of environmental governance. The topic of any single lecture represents an important area of research and could easily be a course in its own right. The course will involve covering difficult theoretical and conceptual material over a relatively short period of time, but hopefully you will feel the additional work is worth it, and develop an appreciation for the complexity of governance arrangements as we move toward tackling new policy challenges.

Course Material

There are four books required for this course as well as various individual readings posted to WebCT. It is your responsibility to read each assignment before the date a reading has been assign.

- Brunner, Ronald, Christine Colburn, Christina Cromley, Roberta Klein, & Elizabeth Olson. 2002. *Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West*. ISBN: 0300091451. [referred to as **Brunner** in schedule].
- Bryan Jones. 2001. *Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and Governance*. ISBN: 0226406385. [referred to as **Jones** in schedule].
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1994. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. ISBN: 0521405998. [referred to as **Ostrom** in schedule].
- Weimer, David and Aidan Vining. 2005. *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice*. ISBN: 0131830015. [referred to as **Weimer & Vining** in schedule].

Most of the readings for this course will be in the required texts. Additional readings can be found online in WebCT. I recommend printing course material from WebCT well in advance of due dates, since there are often technical problems with the server that prevent accessing material at the last minute. WebCT is an important component of the class, and will generally be used to communicate with other students and post grades. Supplemental readings are suggested for any student interested in a specific topic as well as for graduate students preparing preliminary exams. Supplemental readings with an asterisk (*) are strongly suggested as additional readings for graduate students enrolled in the course.

Requirements

Class Participation and Attendance (25%): Class participation is critical to your success in this course. There are numerous in-class activities that require attendance and the class is designed as a mix of lecture and discussion. It is important that you are vocal and raise interesting questions throughout the class. You activity earn your participation credit throughout the course and all students begin with zero participation points. Periodically check your participation score in WebCT to determine your status.

Attendance will be taken using in-class exercises. There are no make-ups for in-class assignments if you are late or miss a class. You are allowed to miss up to 3 classes without penalty. Every additional absence will count as 3% of your grade. There are no excused absences for any reason, so please use your three absences wisely and plan for contingencies.

Mini-essays. (40%). Mini-essay are a major part of this course. Mini-essays address specific questions associated with each week's readings. These one-page essays are a way to focus on specific aspects of each reading, highlight the important ideas, and organize your own perspectives prior to class meetings. Each student is required to write one about every week on the topic they find most interesting. They will be graded from 1-10 points and should be written with the same care you would give an essay assignment. Mini-essays must be submitted to the instructor via email by 4 pm the day

prior to when we will be covering a reading in class. Late assignments will not be accepted under any circumstances. Early submissions are always welcome. The format of the mini-essay is a maximum of one page of single spaced text in 12-point font with one inch margins. By the end of class you should have submitted a total of seventeen (17) mini-essays. Some mini-essays must be submitted by everyone (indicated by * on the reading list), others are left to the student to choose (indicated by the letter a, b, c). Not doing a mini-essay does not excuse a student from not doing that week's readings you are still expected to know the material and answer questions during class. Graduate students are required to distribute their responses to mini-essays to other graduate students in the course via email on the due date.

Research paper. (35%). Each student will write a 8-10 page research paper. This will allow you to develop expertise on a substantive policy area that you are interested in exploring and apply the theories, approaches, and methods covered in this course. The paper will follow a very specific format, so please consult the paper handout often. Graduate students will be expected to write a journal length paper (~16-20 pages) and should arrange to consult with the instructor often during the process. A good place to begin is the section called "research resources" on my webpage.

Course Policies

All assignments are due at the beginning of the class period when they are due. If you cannot turn in an assignment on time, it is your responsibility to contact the instructor at least three days before the deadline. If you have an emergency situation, please leave a message at the office. Late assignments will only be accepted under exceptional circumstances, with advanced permission from the instructor, and may receive a 10% reduction per day.

I expect all students to treat the class as a professional event. This means extending common courtesy to classmates and providing work in a timely and acceptable manner. Class work should be of the same quality you would submit to an employer. All assignments should be stapled, typed, have standard one-inch margins and use 12-point font. Sloppy, handwritten, unstapled assignments may not be accepted, and at a minimum will receive a 10% reduction. If you disagree with a grade you have received, you may discuss it with the instructor during office hours only. Email messages requesting grade changes will not receive a reply.

There is an extremely strict policy against plagiarism in this course. You must submit you own written work. If you have any doubt what constitutes plagiarism, please check with the campus writing center or the instructor. You are responsible for knowing the guidelines. Plagiarized work will receive a failing grade for the course and be reported as academic misconduct for further disciplinary action.

Students with documented disabilities should contact the instructor as soon as possible in order to ensure adequate accommodations.

Course Schedule

Date	Subject / • Required Reading / ► Assignment Due	Mini-essay
T 8/30	Introduction to the Course <i>Required</i> • Class Syllabus ► Student Information Sheet	---
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Public Goods, Public Policy and Collective Action</u></p> <p>This first section of class introduces you to the fundamentals of public policy. It will supply you with the language of policy analysis, introduce public goods theory, and examine the problem of collective action. While this section introduces the most new material in the shortest amount of time, it is important that you understand the concepts clearly since the remainder of the class rests on these conceptual foundations.</p>	
Th 9/01	Public Goods and Public Policy <i>Required</i> • Horgan, John, "In Defense of Common Sense", New York Times, 8/12/05. • Weimer and Vining, Ch. 1, "Preview: The Canadian Salmon Fishery", and Ch. 2, "Introduction to Public Policy Analysis", Ch 5 (pages 77-91 only, focus on understanding Figure 5.1). <i>Supplemental</i> • Axelrod, Bobrow, Heinz, Jones & Landau, (1975), The Place of Policy Analysis in Political Science: Five Perspectives, American Journal of Political Science, 21 (2): 415-433. • Lowi, Theodore. (1964). American Business, Public Policy Case Studies and Political Theory. World Politics, <i>July</i> : 677-715. • Ostrom, Vincent & Elinor Ostrom. (1977). Public Goods and Public Choices. Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improving Performance, Westview Press: Boulder. • Sabatier, Paul. (1996). Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press: Boulder: CO.	---
T 9/06	* Class meets in Room ED1006 * <u>MANDATORY ATTENDENCE</u> * The Problem of Cooperation – <i>The Prisoner's Dilemma</i> ► Turn in Private Farm Optimization <i>Required</i>	Essay 1 *

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hardin, Garrett. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162: 1243-1248. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books: New York. • Lichbach, Mark Irving. (1996). The Cooperator's Dilemma. Economics, cognition, and society, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. • Olson, Mancur. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. • Taylor, Michael. (1987). The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge University Press: New York. 	
Th 9/08	<p>Introduction to Public Policy – Market Failures and the Role of Government</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weimer & Vining, Ch. 4 (pages 54-57 only), Ch. 5, "Rationales for Public Policy: Market Failures" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Weimer & Vining Ch. 4 (all) • Akerlof, George. (1970). The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, • Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (October):1-44. 	Essay 2a
T 9/13	<p>Introduction to Public Policy – More Market Failures</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weimer & Vining, Ch. 6, "Rationales for Public Policy: Other Limitations of the Competitive Framework" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chong, Dennis. (2000). Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. • Hatcher, Aaron, et al. (2000). Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery Regulations. Land Economics, 76 (3):448-461. 	Essay 2b
Th 9/15	<p>Introduction to Public Policy –The Limitations of Government</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ch. 7, "Rationales for Public Policy: Distributional and Other Goals" 	Essay 2c

T 9/20	Market Failures (<i>continued...</i>)	
Th 9/22	<p>Introduction to Public Policy –Government Failures</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weimer & Vining, Ch. 8, "Limits to Public Intervention: Government Failures" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Weimer & Vining, Ch. 12, "Government Supply: Drawing Organizational Boundaries" • Anderson, Terry & Peter Hill. (1994). Rents from Amenity Resources: A Case Study of Yellowstone National Park. The Political Economy of the American West, Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, MD. • Buchanan, James M. (1986). Liberty, Markets and State. New York University Press: New York. • Krueger, Anne. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The American Economic Review, 64 (3): 291-303. 	Essay 2d
T 9/27	<p>Why "Governance"?</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brunner, Ch. 1, "Problems of Governance" • Ostrom, Ch. 1, "Reflections on the Commons" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Elinor. (1994). Neither Market nor State: Governance of Common-Pool Resources in the Twenty-first Century. IFPRI Lecture No. 2, International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, D.C. • Williamson, Oliver. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press: New York. 	Essay 3 *
	<p><u>Institutions</u></p> <p>Institutions are the collection of rights, rules and responsibilities that define relationships among people. As such, they are the foundation of all social interactions, as small as greeting each other in the street, to as complex as the organization of nation-states. They are the building blocks of all public policy, and the one aspect of human-environmental interactions over which we have the most control and ability to change.</p>	
Th 9/29	<p>Institutions – What are they and where do they come from?</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weimer and Vining, Ch. 10 (page 234-237 only) 	Essay 4a

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Ch. 2, "An Institutional Approach to the Study of Self-Organization and Self-governance in CPR Situations". <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crawford, Sue & Elinor Ostrom. (1995). A Grammar of Institutions. American Political Science Review, 89 (3):582-600. • Ellickson, Robert. (1991) Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. • Feeny, David. (1988). The Demand for and Supply of Institutional Arrangements. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development:159-209. ICS Press: San Francisco. 	
T 10/04	<p>Self-governing CPRs</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Ch. 3, "Analyzing Long-enduring, Self-organized, and Self-governed CPRs" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North, Douglas. (1990) Institutions and their Consequences for Economic Performance. In Karen Cook & Margaret Levi, eds. The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. • Faysse, Nicolas. (2005). Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules. Journal of Economic Surveys, 19 (2):239-261. 	Essay 4b
Th 10/06	<p>Institutional Change</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Ch. 4, "Analyzing Institutional Change" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lieberman, Robert. (2002). Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change. American Political Science Review, 94 (December):697-712. • North, Douglass. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. • Levi, Margaret. (1990). A Logic of Institutional Change. In The Limits of Rationality, K.S. Cook and M. Levi (eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 	Essay 4c
T 10/11	<p>Institutional Failure</p> <p><i>Required</i></p>	Essay 4d

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Ch. 5, "Analyzing Institutional Failures and Fragilities" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McCay, Bonnie J., and James M. Acheson. (1987). <i>The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources</i>. University of Arizona Press: Tucson. 	
Th 10/13	<p>Analyzing Self-governing Institutional Arrangements</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Ch. 6, "A Framework for Analysis of Self-organizing and Self-governing CPRs" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bromley, Daniel. (1992). <i>Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy</i>. Institute for Contemporary Studies: San Francisco. • Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, & Roy Gardner. (1994). <i>Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources</i>. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. • Ostrom, Elinor. (2005). <i>Understanding Institutional Diversity</i>. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J. 	Essay 5a
T 10/18	<p>Property Rights and Institutional Change</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anderson, Terry & Peter Hill (1977). From Free Grass to Fences: Transforming the Commons of the American West, p. 200-215. Reprinted in <i>Managing the Common</i>, John Baden (ed.) W.H. Freeman: San Francisco. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz. (1973). The Property Right Paradigm. <i>Journal of Economic History</i>, 33 (March):16-27. • Libecap, Gary D. (1989). <i>Contracting for Property Rights</i>. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, Mass. • Runge, Carlisle Ford. (1981). Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context. <i>American Journal of Agricultural Economics</i>, 63 (4):595-606. 	Essay 5b
Th 10/20	<p>Property Rights and Environmental Resources</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cole, Daniel. (1999). Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental Protection. <i>Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum</i>, v. 10: 103-130. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bromley, Daniel. (1991). <i>Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy</i>. Oxford University Press: Oxford, U.K. 	Essay 5c

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ostrom, Elinor. (2000). Private and Common Property Rights. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Civil Law and Economics, 332-379. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, England. • Rose, Carol M. (1998). The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Mission Trades and Ecosystems. Minnesota Law Review, 83 (129):169-174. 	
	<p><u>Models of Decision-making</u></p> <p>All policy recommendations for dealing with public problems are based on specific assumptions about human motives and behaviors. This section examines how these assumptions determine the type, and often the outcome, of policy interventions. It examines the fundamental behavioral assumptions underlying the organizations of markets and governments.</p>	
T 10/25	<p>Theories of Decision-making</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jones, Preface, Ch. 1, "Traces of Eve", and Ch. 2, "Adaptation and Its Limits" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • North, Douglass. (1993). What do we mean by rationality? Public Choice, 77:159-162. • Simon, Herbert, Alexander, Egidi, Massimo, Marris, Robin Laphorn. (1992). Economics, bounded rationality and the cognitive revolution. Elgar Pub. Co: Brookfield, VT. • Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, & Philip Tetlock. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. • Tversky, Amos & Daniel Kahneman. (1974). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 185: 1124-1131. 	Essay 6a
Th 10/27	<p>Choice and Institutions</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jones, Ch. 3 (69-83 only) & Ch. 5, "A Social Species: Substantive Limits on Adaptive Choice" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Jones, Ch. 4, "Human Information Processing" • Pellikaan, Huib & Robert J. van der Veen. (2002). Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design: Theories of Institutional Design. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 	Essay 6b

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knight, Jack. (1992). Institutions and strategic choice: information, sanctions, and social expectations. <i>Institutions and Social Conflict</i>. 	
T 11/01	<p>Wildlife Application</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brunner, Ch. 3, "Wolf Recovery in the Northern Rockies" & Ch. 4, "Bison Management in Greater Yellowstone" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gibson, Clark. (1999). <i>Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa</i>. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. • Lueck, Dean. (1991). Ownership and the Regulation of Wildlife. <i>Economic Inquiry</i>:249-260. 	Essay 6c
Th 11/03	<p>Trust</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lubell, Mark, Mark Schneider and John Scholz (2002). Watershed Partnerships and the emergence of collective action institutions. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 46 (1): 148-163. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bohnet, Iris, Bruno Frey, Steffen Huck. (2001). More Order with Less Law: Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 95 (1):131-144. • Cook, Karen S. (2001). <i>Trust In Society</i>. Russell Sage Foundation: New York. • Levi, Margaret and Stocker, Laura. Political Trust and Trustworthiness. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 3: 475-507. 	Essay 7a
T 11/08	<p>Values and Preferences</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chong, Dennis (2000) <i>Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society</i>, Ch. 1 "Interests versus Values" & Ch. 2 "A model of Individual Choice". <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Levi, Margaret. (1997). <i>Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism</i>. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. • Hochschild, Jennifer. (1981). <i>What's Fair?</i> Harvard University Press. • Zafonte, Matthew and Paul Sabatier. (1998). Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i>, 10 (4): 473-505. 	Essay 7b

Th 11/10	<p>Correcting Market and Government Failures</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weimer and Vining, Ch. 10, "Correcting Market and Government Failures: Generic Policies". <p>► Submit First Draft of Paper</p> <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cole, Daniel & Peter Grossman. (1999). When is Command and Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection. • Sterner, Thomas. (2003). Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management. Resources for the Future: Washington, D.C. • Vedung, E. (1998). Policy Instruments: Typologies and Theories. Carrots, Sticks & Sermons: Policy Instruments and their Evaluation, Transaction Publications. 	Essay 7c
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Policy Design and Performance</u></p> <p>The final section of class brings together the various ideas we have examined so far. It examines how by examining decision-making, we can better understand the design of institutions, and thus the success and failures of various policies.</p>	
T 11/15	<p>Organizations, Formal Institutions, and American Public Policy</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jones, Ch. 6, "The Behavioral Theory of Organizations" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Jones, Ch. 7, "Efficient Markets, Efficient Politics, and the Index Problem." • Riker, William H. (1980). Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. APSR 74(2): 432-436. 	Essay 8a
Th 11/17	<p>Paper Review Session</p> <p>► Submit Peer-Reviews</p>	
T 11/22	<p>Formal Organizations</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jones, Ch. 8, "The Design and Evolution of Formal Institutions" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March, James and John Olsen. (1989). Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions. Governance, 9(3): 247. 	Essay 8b

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moe, Terry. (1990). Political Institutions: The neglected side of the story. <i>Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations</i>, 6:213-235. 	
Th 11/24	Holiday	
T 11/29	<p>Water Application</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brunner, Ch. 2, "Water Management and the Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee" • Wilds, Leah J. & Richard Acton. Resolving the Water Dilemma: Past Problems and Future Trends. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challen, Ray. (2000). Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Environmental Policy: Institutional Reform for Water Resources. <i>New Horizons in Environmental Economics</i>, Edward Elgar. • Tang, S.Y. (1992). Institutions and Collective Action: Self-governance in Irrigation. 151. ICS: San Francisco. • Sproule-Jones, Mark. (2002). Restoration of the Great Lakes: Promise, Practices, Performance. Michigan State University Press. • Bloomquist, William. (1992). Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California. ICS: San Francisco. 	Essay 8c
Th 12/01	<p>Implementation</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schneider, Anne and Helen Ingram (1990), Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools. <i>Journal of Politics</i>, 52 (2): 510. • Weimer & Vining, Ch 11 "Adoption and Implementation" <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Sabatier, Paul. (1986). Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a critical analysis and suggested synthesis. <i>Journal of Public Policy</i>, 6 (1):21-48. • Lipsky, Michael. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy - Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. • Wildavsky, Aaron (1973). Implementation. University of California Press: Berkeley. 	Essay 9a
T 12/06	<p>Communities</p> <p><i>Required</i></p>	Essay 9b

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brunner, Ch. 6, "Harvesting Experience" <p>► Submit Final Paper</p> <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baland, Jean-Marie & Jean-Philippe Platteau. (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Clarendon Press: Oxford. • Bowles, Samuel & Herbert Gintis. (2002). Social Capital and Community Governance. <i>Economic Journal</i>, 112:419-436. • Putnam, Robert. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's declining social capital. <i>Journal of Democracy</i>, 6 (1):65-78. 	
Th 12/08	<p>Public Entrepreneurship</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mintrom, Michael (1997). Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>, 41(3): 738-770. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Teske, Paul, Mark Schneider, Michael Mintrom <i>et al.</i> (1993). Establishing the Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, Movers and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods. <i>APSR</i>, 87:703-713. • Schneider, Mark and Paul Teske. (1993). The Antigrowth Entrepreneur: Challenging the "Equilibrium" of the growth Machine. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, 55, 1993: 720-736. 	Essay 9c
T 12/13	<p>Directions in the Study of Environmental Governance</p> <p><i>Required</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jones, Ch. 9, "Overestimation, Neglect, and Rationality" • Ostrom, Elinor (1998). Coping with Tragedies of the Commons. <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i>, 2: 493-535. <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dietz, Thomas and Paul Stern. (2002). New Tools for Environmental Protection: Education, Information, and Voluntary Measures. National Academy Press: Washington D.C. 	Essay 10 *

Note: Like most things in life, this syllabus is a work in progress. I reserve the right to make modifications as appropriate. Changes will be announced in class and posted online.